Deep Learning (DL) has been shown to be particularly vulnerable to adversarial samples. To combat adversarial strategies, numerous defenses have been proposed in the literature. Among these, feature squeezing emerges as an effective defense by reducing unnecessary features without changing the DL model. However, feature squeezing is a deterministic process: as soon as an adversarial sample is found, this sample will always succeed against the classifier.
Introduction
Deep learning (DL) has advanced rapidly in recent years fueled by big data and readily available cheap computation power. Beyond standard machine learning applications, DL has been found extremely useful in numerous security-critical applications such as face recognition [31] and malware classification [2, 12, 36] .
When used in such applications, recent studies show that DL is particularly vulnerable to adversarial samples, which are obtained from correctly classified samples by adding carefully selected perturbations to fool classifiers [6, 10, 17, 24] . These perturbations are chosen in such a way that they are large enough to affect the model prediction but small enough to go unnoticed (e.g., by a visual check in image recognition applications).
To face the ever increasing number of attacks against DL algorithms, several defensive techniques have been proposed in the literature [20, 23, 26, 35] . Traditional defense strategies advocate hiding model parameters [26] , limiting feature space [22] , and providing response to each query on the basis of training data in the vicinity of the query [20] . However, the effectiveness of such strategies in thwarting adversarial samples is limited. For instance, even when the model parameters are not known, the adversary can use the input-output interface of the classifier to train a substitute model, and then use such model to find adversarial samples that transfer to the original classifier.
To overcome these limitations, a number of recent defenses [22, 35, 37] propose to squeeze features on input data in order to limit the effect of adversarial samples. Feature Squeezing [35] transforms input by reducing unnecessary features without changing the DL model. Here, the intuition is that squeezing the features limits the adversary's degree of freedom in choosing the perturbation, because different perturbations will have the same effect after squeezing. Feature Squeezing is based on the assumption that natural data leads to the same prediction before and after squeezing, while adversarial samples are more likely to yield different predictions in original and transformed form. The discrepancy in outputs between original and squeezed input helps the classifier to detect adversarial samples and reject them. Examples of feature squeezing include changing the pixel values by reducing color bit depth and smoothing pixels based on the values of their nearby pixels [35] . In doing so, feature squeezing does not modify the original classifier, but simply modifies the inputs that are being processed by the unmodified classifier.
However, feature squeezing is a deterministic process: once an adversarial sample is found, it will always succeed. In other words, the adversary can create adversarial samples, predict which ones will be rejected by the model, and only use those (fewer) samples that remain successful in spite of feature squeezing. When used in security-critical applications, such an adversary is likely to remain undetected and his samples will be misclassified all the times.
We argue that a secure machine learning defense should not only harden the task of finding adversarial examples, but it should also seek to effectively prevent the adversary from predicting the success of the various samples that have been already found. Namely, a secure machine learning system should ensure that no adversary which does not know the randomization strategy can reliably distinguish whether a given adversarial sample succeeds.
In this work, we address this problem and propose a defense that mitigates attacks on feature squeezing when used in an image classification setting (a setting where where adversarial examples have been most explored). Namely, we develop a security model to formally define robustness of machine learning algorithms under various adversarial classes. Our security model is inspired by cryptographic definitions of security, and aims to specifically capture the notion of unpredictability of successful adversarial samples. We then present our solution, Mix'n'Squeeze, that enhances feature squeezing to achieve the aforementioned property of unpredictability. More specifically, Mix'n'Squeeze embeds specially-crafted key-based randomness within the input to the classifier. The input-randomization process operates on every pixel of the image independently by adding randomly chosen values to all pixels, and the so-transformed image is then fed to the original classifier. Our strategy ensures that input randomization does not significantly affect the classifier's predictions on legitimate inputs, yet it significantly reduces the success rate of state-of-the-art (blackbox and graybox) attacks and, due to the randomness, it introduces unpredictability to the success of adversarial samples.
We empirically evaluate the effectiveness of Mix'n'Squeeze against state of the art strategies [1, 6, 10, 13, 17, 21, 25 ] to generate adversarial samples from MNIST, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet datasets.
Our experimental results show thatMix'n'Squeeze is effective in hardening security against adversarial samples in the sense of unpredictability of successful samples. Namely, our results show that introducing carefully crafted key-based randomness at pixel level when performing feature squeezing does not hamper the accuracy of the overall system when compared to the deterministic feature squeezing solution due to [35] . More surprisingly, our results also suggest that Mix'n'Squeeze can improve the overall accuracy compared to existing defenses against blackbox and graybox adversaries [35] .
We argue that Mix'n'Squeeze is generic and can be effectively fitted to a multitude of applications-beyond image classification. Namely, although a number of contributions hint on the use of randomization as a possible avenue to strengthen the security of DL algorithms, we believe that this work emerges as the first comprehensive work that analyzes both qualitatively and empirically the impact of key-based randomness on this family of machine learning algorithms under state of the art adversarial strategies.
We summarize our contributions as follows:
Security Model. We develop a novel security model that formalizes robustness of machine learning algorithms under evasion attacks. Our framework is generic, captures a broad variety of machine learning systems and applications, and addresses a security goal that has not been covered so far, namely unpredictability of (the success of) adversarial samples in a graybox model. Concrete Instantiation. We propose Mix'n'Squeeze, a novel deep-learning defensive strategy that extends feature squeezing to increase its robustness against adversarial samples. Mix'n'Squeeze randomizes all pixels of an input image, one by one, by adding carefully selected randomness such that the accuracy does not considerably degrade while adversarial samples are no longer effective.
Implementation & Evaluation. We implement and evaluate our solution in the context of image classification on the MNIST, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet datasets. We show that Mix'n'Squeeze does not hamper the accuracy of the classifier and increases robustness against state of the art graybox strategies-with a boost in accuracy on adversarial samples from 0% to 70-95% for the He et al. attack [13] , which completely defeats Feature Squeezing.
The rest this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents background of adversarial learning and related work in the area. In Section 3, we present our security model to define robustness of machine learning classifiers to adversarial samples. In Section 4, we present our solution Mix'n'Squeeze, and evaluate its effectiveness to adversarial samples by performing extensive experiments against state-of-the art attacks in Section 5. We conclude the paper in Section 6.
Background and Related Work
In this section we introduce the notation and relevant concepts for the subsequent sections of this paper; we summarize the most prominent attacks against machine learning algorithms, and discuss existing defensive techniques that aim at mitigating these attacks.
Notation & Conventions
Let X be a (finite) set, and let D : X → [0, 1] be a probability distribution. We denote by x ← D X the random sampling of an element x according to distribution D; we write x ← $ X for sampling x uniformly at random. Similarly, for n ∈ N we write S ← D X n to indicate that set S is defined by sampling n elements from X with distribution D. If R(x) is a random variable based on the random choice x ← D X, we denote its expected value by E D [R(x)]. For an event E, we denote by 1 E the random variable such that 1 E = 1 if E occurs, else 1 E = 0.
A classification problem for a function f : X → Y consists in assigning to instances x ∈ X the corresponding class (or label) y ∈ Y . We refer to such a function f as ground truth. The goal of a machine-learning system for classification is to derive, given a set of labeled instances (x, y) such that y = f (x), an algorithm C-called classifier or model-that emulates function f . The process of deriving a classifier from labeled instances is referred to as training, while when the actual classifier is deployed we talk about testing. Typically, the classifier is deterministic and can be thus thought of as a function. In this work, however, we cover a broader class of classifiers and let C be any, possibly randomized algorithm. If C is randomized, we write y ← $ C(x) to denote that on input x the classifier, run on freshly sampled randomness, outputs label y.
Accuracy and error. Let C : X → Y be a deterministic classifier. For X ⊆ X we denote by X (C) = {x ∈ X : C(x) = f (x)} the set of instances in X where C agrees with f . Similarly, we denote by X (C) = {x ∈ X : C(x) = f (x)} the set of misclassified instances.
Let D : X → [0, 1] be any distribution over the instance space. The (expected) accuracy of a classifier C with respect to D is the probability over the choice of x ← D X that C agrees with f on input x:
Similarly, the classifier's (expected) error is the probability that C makes a mistake on a randomly chosen x ← D X:
By definition, it holds acc D (C) = 1 − err D (C). Accuracy and error provide a metric to determine how well a given classifier approximates the ground truth on instances chosen according to distribution D. Using the notation introduced above, the expected error can be interpreted as the probability of a randomly chosen instance x ← D X falling in the error space X (C). In reality, the 'natural' distribution D on the input space X is unknown, and can at best be represented by available (correctly) labeled data. More pragmatic metrics are the classifier's empirical accuracy, respectively, empirical error w.r.t. a given dataset D = {(x, f (x)) : x ∈ X D }, for some X D ⊂ X:
For randomized classifiers, the definitions of expected error and empirical error need to be augmented to incorporate the randomness of the classifier. A natural way is to average, in both cases, over such randomness.
Note that accuracy and error can also be used to capture the performance of a classifier w.r.t. an adversarially chosen distribution D A , respectively, input set X A .
Adversarial Samples
The accuracy of a machine-learning algorithm is measured w.r.t. samples drawn from a 'natural' distribution D : X → [0, 1] over the input space. This approach is grounded in results from computational learning theory [32] , which guarantee a low classification error as long as samples used at test time originate from the same distribution of the training samples. However, while this assumption may be realistic in a pure machine-learning setting, it is hard to justify in general. In cybersecurity, for instance, the "test samples" are generated by an adversary A attempting to bypass a machine-learning protected system, and may thus be specifically crafted to deviate from the training samples. This state of affair has been confirmed by the recent advances in attacking machine learning systems through adversarial samples (a.k.a. adversarial samples) [30] . An adversarial sample is typically defined as a slightly perturbed instance x , obtained from some labeled sample (x, y), that belongs to the original class despite the perturbation, yet is classified wrongly. Formally: x and x have a relatively small distance d(x, x ) ≤ ε, f (x ) = y, and C(x ) = y. The intuition behind this definition originates from image classification: the perturbation ε is sufficiently small to guarantee that x (visually) looks the same as x, and at the same time it is large enough to induce the classifier to make a mistake on x . In this context, the three most common metrics to measure the distance between an adversarial sample x and its legitimate counterpart x are based on the
, based on the maximum difference between pixels at corresponding positions.
In the formulas above, x i − x i is the difference between the pixels at position i of image x and image x , respectively. For a distance metric d p , we denote by || · || p the corresponding norm.
Depending on the attacker's goal, adversarial samples can be categorized as targeted and untargeted. A targeted adversarial sample x is one that the classifier predicts as belonging to a targeted label y t = y, where y is the true label; an untargeted sample is assigned any label rather than y instead.
Generating Adversarial Samples
The rest of this section presents prominent techniques to generate adversarial samples against DL systems.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM). Given an input x, the FGSM method [10] generates an adversarial sample x by applying a small perturbation to all pixels of x, where "small" means up to a certain threshold ε according to the L ∞ -norm. Concretely, x is crafted by calculating one-step gradient update on x (denoted ∇ x ) with perturbation of magnitude ε, as follows:
Here, L(C(x), y) is the loss of the classifier for returning label C(x) when the true label is y, and ε represents the tolerated amount of perturbation on all pixels of x which ensures that x and x are visually unchanged. The perturbation is chosen in order to maximize L(C(x ), y).
Basic Iterative Method (BIM). BIM [17] applies FGSM iteratively, each time with smaller step-width perturbation α ε. For each iteration, every pixel value of the "current" resulting image that exceeds an ε-neighborhood of x (according to L 2 or L ∞ ) is clipped, as follows:
Jacobian Saliency Map Approach (JSMA). In contrast to FGSM and BIM, the JSMA method [25] generates x by modifying only a subset of x's pixels. To this end, JSMA selects so-called high saliency pixels for perturbation according to the values of the forward derivative matrix ∇ x C(x). The salience score is calculated for each pixel to describe how the pixel will contribute to the target class label y t . This process is repeated until the attack succeeds.
Carlini-Wagner (CW). CW attacks [6] use techniques that require only small perturbations on inputs, work for both targeted and untargeted attacks, and are compatible with all of the distance metrics L 0 , L 2 and L ∞ . Given an image x and a distance metric L p , p ∈ {0, 2, ∞}, the CW method uses existing optimization algorithms to search for a value ε such that x + ε ∈ [0, 1] n and the quantity ||ε|| p +c·g(x +ε) is minimized, where c is an empirically chosen parameter, and g is a prediction objective function such that g(x ) ≤ 0 if and only if the predicted label C(x ) is incorrect (meaning that the attack succeeds). There are different options to choose g. One of those is g(x ) = max(Z(x ) y −max(Z(x ) i : i = y), −k). Here y is the ground truth label of x and Z(x ) is the pre-softmax classification result vector (i.e., logits); and −k is the configurable confidence level of the attack. The perturbation result must be still a valid image, i.e., ∀i, 0 ≤ x i +ε i ≤ 1. This is called "box constraint" in the context of optimization.
DeepFool. The basic idea of DeepFool attack [21] is to find the closest decision boundary to a given input image x and iteratively perturbate x until the resulting x crosses the boundary, so that it can fool the classifier. As it is hard to search for the closest boundary in high dimensional and non-linear spaces, DeepFool solves the problem on approximated linear spaces. Given an input image x and a classifier C, this method generates a candidate adversarial sample for a given iteration by first linearizing C around the current x and then obtaining the next sample as x = x + r where r = argmin r ||r || p , subject to C(x ) = C(x) and for any p-norm. This process generates adversarial samples which require small perturbation to cross the boundary.
Defensive techniques
In this section we discuss several defensive techniques that aim at thwarting adversarial samples.
Adversarial Training. As we mentioned earlier, a classifier is guaranteed to make good predictions at test time as long as it has been trained on (sufficiently many) samples drawn from the same distribution as the test samples. The idea behind adversarial training is based on this principle: to make the input distribution at training time closer to the one at test time, known adversarial samples are added (together with correct ground-truth labels) to the training set. Grosse et al. [11] propose to introduce an additional class for adversarial samples and retrain the classifier to also recognize such class. Concretely, the classifier is first trained normally on the original training data; the resulting classifier is then used (as a target) to generate successful adversarial samples; finally, the so obtained adversarial samples are labeled and used, together with the original training data, to train a new classifier; the latter is supposedly robust against adversarial samples. Gong et al. [9] introduce a technique to build a binary classifier for clustering normal samples and adversarial samples. Madry et al. [19] propose a generic training methodology targeting robustness against all adversarial samples generated by applying small perturbations. This methodology is based on the idea that, if the training set contains sufficiently representative adversarial samples, the resulting classifier will be able to withstand every attack. Following this principle, the "sufficiently representative" adversarial samples are generated using a projected gradient descent (PDG) attack, which is a variant of the BIM attack and is referred to as a "universal" attack among the first-order approaches. The resulting trained networks, based on MNIST and CIFAR datasets respectively, achieve different levels of robustness against FGSM, PGD, and CW attacks.
Although prior work [9, 11, 19, 29, 30] has demonstrated the feasibility of this technique, adversarial training requires a large number of samples that are expensive to generate. In addition, it does not resist unknown attacks.
Defensive Distillation. In deep learning, distillation is a training procedure initially designed to train a network using knowledge transferred from another network. Defensive distillation [26] , instead of transferring knowledge between different architectures, was proposed to use the knowledge extracted from the same network to improve its own resilience to adversarial samples. Distillation allows the model to generalize better to samples outside of its training dataset. To perform a distillation, the first neural network is trained normally with original training data. The "softmax" layer is defined as a layer that receives the output of the last hidden layer of the network in form of a probability vector which represents a probability to each class of the dataset to the input. The probability vector outputs from the first network are then used to labeled the training data for the second network. The second network is trained by this newly labeled data. Output of the second network is a probability vector prediction. More specifically, defensive distillation trains the classifier to be resilient to gradient-based attacks by hiding gradient between softmax layer and the output layer. Unfortunately defensive distillation is still evaded according to [6] .
Detection of Adversarial Samples. Early methods to detect adversarial samples [8, 11] derive statistical properties from large datasets of legitimate samples and of adversarial samples, and then inspect those properties to tell whether a new and unknown sample is legitimate or adversarial. Even though these techniques where shown to be quite robust, they are computationally expensive and require large datasets for the reliability of statistical results. A different approach is to train a detector to specifically learn adversarial samples. An instantiation of this technique was introduced by Meng and Chen [20] , who propose a systemdubbed MagNet-that uses detector and reformer networks. MagNet relies on the assumption that "natural" data lie on a manifold of significantly smaller dimension than the whole input space X, while most "adversarial" samples fall outside the manifold. Concretely, it employs a detector which deems samples far from the manifold as adversarial, and a reformer for those samples that fall off, but are close enough to, the manifold, effectively moving them towards the manifold and enforcing that adversarial samples generated with a small perturbation are "sanitized". Xu et al. [35] propose a similar approach, i.e., feature squeezing, to detect adversarial samples using the discrepancy of output predictions between adversarial and legitimate samples which indicate malicious inputs. This method is less expensive compared to MagNet.
Input Transformation. Input transformation is a technique that does not require changing the trained model. The goal is to reduce the sensitivity of the model to small changes in input. It has been suggested to reduce the number of dimensions of input [22] , however it also changes input's structure making it no longer a valid format for the classification model.
Recent defenses [12, 20, 37] propose to squeeze features on input data to disable effect of adversarial samples crafted by performing small perturbations to legitimate inputs. MagNet [20] introduces two reforming techniques on input: noise-based reformer and autoencoder reformer. In the former, random noise is applied to both normal and adversarial samples. In the latter, an autoencoder transforms the input through a process of encoding and then decoding such that the reconstruction error is minimal on legitimate samples. The autoencoder transforms adversarial samples so that they end up closer to the legitimate samples and thus helping in correct classification. The autoencoder learns from training dataset (on legitimate samples) in order to minimize construction error between encoding and decoding outputs. MagNet allows to randomly choose an autoencoder among a set of pre-trained autoencoders. This prohibits the attacker to predict which autoencoder will transform the adversarial input, thus complicating their task.
Randomness-based defenses. Zhou et al. [38] propose two ways to use randomness for strengthening DNN models: to add random noise to the weights of a trained DNN model, and to select at random a model from a pool of train DNN models for each test input. Xie et al. [34] use randomness in a different way: to resize the image to a random size, or to add padding zeroes in a randomized fashion. Both techniques are orthogonal to ours.
Cao and Gong [4] propose a technique region-based classification that is, at a first look, similar in spirit to ours. Given a test sample x, region-based classifica-tion chooses multiple data points uniformly at random from a hypercube centered at x, computes the corresponding labels according to the original DNN model, and returns the majority vote among these labels. The authors claim that region-based classification is equivalent to adding random noise to the input image. Note, however, that while our technique adds random noise to all pixels of the input and then makes a prediction on the resulting image, region-based classification does not touch the individual pixels but generates multiple images instead.
Certified defenses. A recent approach to combat adversarial samples is to design so-called certified defenses [7, 14, 27, 28, 33] , which provide provable guarantees against bounded adversarial perturbations. Given a classifier and an input image, the idea is to derive an upper bound on the worst-case loss against norm-based attackers. Such bound provides a "certificate of robustness", as it guarantees that no perturbation within the allowed threshold can turn the starting image into an adversarial one, therefore ruling out all attacks which are restricted to the given threshold. Certified defenses offer a promising direction towards ending the arms race between attackers and defenders. However, these techniques need further investigation as they currently do not scale to large datasets.
A more scalable solution is the PixelDP transform by Lécuyer et al. [18] . PixelDP leverages differential privacy to increase the robustness of a generic classifier, and offers probabilistic 1 certificates of robustness for several datasets, including ImageNet which is large. This solution trades scalability with clean-data accuracy, which drops significantly as the allowed adversarial perturbation increases. However, despite offering provable guarantees, robustness certificates only hold with respect to the original image, meaning that only test inputs can be certified [5] . It is thus unclear which guarantees a robustness certificate can offer for data that was not part of the test set. This limitation is particularly evident in applications such as face or handwritten recognition where it is virtually impossible to capture all possible images within the original test set.
Feature squeezing This technique, introduced by Xu et al. [35] , transforms the input by reducing unnecessary features while keeping the DL model intact. Feature Squeezing is a generic transformation technique to reduce feature input space such that it can limit opportunities for an adversary to generate adversarial samples. The approach assumes that legitimate samples have same output on original and transformed form while adversarial samples have larger difference on out-puts, the discrepancy of outputs helps to reject adversarial samples. In this paper, we study the two proposed squeezing techniques, squeezing color bit depths and spatial smoothing.
Squeezing color bits relies on the assumption that large color bit depth is not necessary for a classifier to interpret an image. The authors consider 8-bit gray scale images of size 28 × 28 pixels (MNIST dataset) and 24-bit color images of size 32 × 32 pixels (CIFAR-10 and ImageNet datasets) in their experiments. The 8-bit gray scale images are squeezed to 1-bit monochrome images by using a binary filter with cut-off set to 0.5, while each channel of the 24-bit color images (8-bit per color channel) is squeezed to 4 or 5 bits. Each channel can be reduced to i-bit depth by multiplying the input value with 2 i − 1, rounded up to integers and then divided by
The local smoothing is a type of spatial smoothing technique that adjusts the value of each pixel based on aggregated values, e.g., by taking median of its neighborhood pixels. The median smoothing technique follows Gaussian smoothing design. The values of neighborhood pixels are decided by a configurable sliding window of which size ranges from 1 to entire image. Experiments in [35] show that median smoothing with 2 × 2 and 3 × 3 sliding window is effective. Another way to perform spatial smoothing is non-local smoothing. Non-local smoothing considers a large area to compute replacement value for each pixel. Given an image patch, non-local smoothing searches for all similar patches and replaces the center patch with the average of similar patches. We use the notation proposed by Xu et al. [35] to denote a filter as "non-local means (a-b-c)", where a is the search window a × a, b the patch size b × b and c the filter strength. Compared to MagNet [20] , feature squeezing is superior in some cases but worse in others.
Security Model
In this section, we present a security model for evasion attacks that allows us to define security of a classifier in terms of robustness and, in addition, in the sense of unpredictability of the success of adversarial samples.
Motivation. In deep learning based systems, the existence of adversarial samples cannot be avoided. Therefore, research so far has focused on reducing the number of adversarial samples and making their discovery hard. The outcome of this effort is a series of defenses that either aim to detect adversarial samples and discard them, thus narrowing the space of potential errors, or to train the classifier on known adversarial samples, effectively correcting the classifier's output on these samples.
There is, however, a problem that all these defensive techniques have in common: once a successful adversarial sample has been found, it will always succeed-until the classifier is retrained. All in all, despite the effort in reducing adversarial samples, little thought has been given to make the success of adversarial samples unpredictable. To overcome the above limitation, we set out to propose a defense which makes it hard to predict whether a given sample will be misclassified. Since no deterministic defense can meet such requirement, in Section 4 we design a technique that randomizes the classification process in order to make it harder for an adversary to predict whether a given adversarial sample will be misclassified.
In the rest of this section, we introduce a general security model that covers both deterministic and randomized classification algorithms, and allows us to define robustness to adversarial samples as well as the aforementioned concept of unpredictability.
Evasion attacks. Our model considers an attack scenario in which an adversary A aims at defeating a classifier C by generating adversarial samples starting from "natural" samples. Following the approach of modern cryptography, our security model reproduces the above scenario through a security game between A and C, that we name evasion under chosen-sample attacks (EV-CSA). The game is illustrated in Figure 1 .
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Figure 1: Security game for targeted evasion under chosen-sample attacks (EV-CSA), involving an adversary A against a classifier C. To capture untargeted attacks it suffices to replace the inputs to the Attack oracle with pairs (x, x ) and the first condition of line 11 with C(x ) = C(x) (i.e., A specifies no target label).
The adversary's goal in the EV-CSA game is to present a number of adversarial samples generated from a set X D ⊂ X of "naturally occurring" samples (which we implicitly assume to be labeled). 2 The number N of adversarial samples, 1 ≤ N ≤ |X D |, is a game parameter and, as we will see later, can be adapted to capture different security goals.
We specify the amount of information that A has about the adversarial task by passing the relevant inputs: the allowed distortion ε, the number N of adversarial samples, the classifier's code C , and the set X D of benign samples. Further, by limiting the amount of information encoded in C , our game can cover different adversarial models such as "whitebox" (a.k.a. fully adaptive), meaning that A knows every detail about the classifier, including neural-network weights and any defense mechanism in place, "blackbox" (a.k.a. non adaptive), i.e., A knows only public information about C, and intermediate attacker's models, so-called "graybox" (a.k.a. semi-adaptive), in which A has only partial information about the classifier's internals and/or defensive layers. Graybox attacks include those agnostic of a defense mechanism. In this case, the adversary knows the original classifier fully, hence it is not blackbox, but it does not know the defense, hence it is not whitebox either. These adversaries are often called non adaptive in the literature, meaning "non adaptive to the defense". As we will see later, our defense improves robustness against blackbox and graybox adversaries; we stress, however, that the EV-CSA game is general enough to capture all the aforementioned attacker models. We further let the adversary interact with the classifier through an oracle Classify, i.e., A can query C on any input x of their choosing and obtain the corresponding labelŷ = C(x). The game also provides the adversary with a second oracle, denoted by Attack, which lets A submit candidate adversarial samples. This oracle allows us to describe A's goal formally and to define robustness to adversarial samples, as we see next. The adversary can present an adversarial sample by submitting a query (x, x , y t ) to the Attack oracle, where x is the starting sample, x is the candidate adversarial sample, and y t is the target label. Upon being queried, the oracle then checks whether the adversary reached the query limit q ≥ N, terminating the game in such a case (cf. line 4). Otherwise, it checks whether the adversarial sample x is "fresh", in the sense that no other adversarial sample x has been already proposed for the same starting image x (cf. line 8), which is necessary to invalidate trivial attacks that artificially achieve high success rate, e.g., by presenting "the same" adversarial sample over and over, in a trivially modified version. 3 If the query gets through the checks, the oracle adds the fresh pair (x, x ) to the adversarial set X A , and further checks whether the classifier errs on x as desired, by predicting its class as y t , and whether x is sufficiently close to x, i.e., d(x, x ) ≤ ε according to some pre-established distance metric d. In case of success, the game rewards the adversary by increasing the counter n which records the number of successful samples (cf. line 12).
Once the attacker submits N adversarial samples, that we call the chosen samples, the game terminates by outputting the success rate of the adversary, i.e., the portion of chosen samples that fooled the classifier. For a given execution of the security game involving adversary A, with perturbation budget ε, "playing" against classifier C for a dataset X D , we denote the game's output by succ ev-csa A,ε,N (C, X D ) = n/N, which stands for success rate in the EV-CSA game. In the following, we may slightly abuse notation and omit the game's parameters ε, N, and X D when they are clear from the context.
An execution of the EV-CSA game depends on the adversarial strategy A and the classifier C-both of which may be randomized. In particular, if the game depends on any randomness (used by the adversary, by the classifier, or both), the outcome is determined by the value of the randomness, and the success rate is a random variable. Henceforth, we restrict the attention to the common case of deterministic adversaries; thus, for any such adversary A, the success rate succ ev-csa A (C) exclusively depends on the classifier's randomness (if any).
Observe that the Classify oracle provides no extra power to whitebox adversaries, as having full knowledge of the classifier allows A to emulate the oracle. It is, however, necessary to cover weaker attacks, such as transferability attacks [24] (which are blackbox), and attacks oblivious of the defense (which are graybox). In particular, the Classify oracle highlights the above-mentioned vulnerability of deterministic classifiers against non-adaptive adversaries: since in this case successful adversarial samples will always be misclassified, an adversary could run a defense-oblivious strategy to generate adversarial samples, and then use the Classify oracle to select, among those, the samples that succeed.
Deterministic vs. randomized classifiers. We stress that the Attack oracle does not reflect an actual capability of the attacker, however, it provides a natural abstraction for determining A's success rate. In particular, if only deterministic classifiers were considered, having A submit their samples through the oracle is equivalent to letting A present a set X A of N samples directly. In this case, A's success rate would be:
is the empirical error of C w.r.t. the set of adversarial samples X A (as defined in Equation (3) on page 3). That is, the usual notion of success rate against deterministic classifiers is a special case of our notion. The reason for introducing the Attack oracle is precisely that, when randomized classifiers are considered, it is no longer meaningful to talk about a set of adversarial examples (a given sample x may be correctly labeled for some choices of C's randomness while being misclassified for a different randomness).
Defining effective defenses and robustness. Our security game provides a formal language to express the effectiveness of a defense in making a given classifier "more robust" to attacks. For a classifier C, let C d denote the classifier obtained from C by applying a defense d. Intuitively, a defense d is effective against an attack A if either the success rate of A after applying the defense is significantly smaller than their success rate when no defense is in place, or a larger distortion is necessary to achieve that success rate. Formally, we say that a defense d for classifier C is effective against attack A, or equivalently that C d is more robust than C, if either
Defining different adversarial tasks. While the security game allows us to compactly capture several evasion scenarios, it is not sufficient, by itself, to tell whether a given attack strategy is "good" against the attacked classifier. What is missing is a characterization of the attacker's goal in terms of their success rate. In fact, the attacker's goal in bypassing the classifier is tightly coupled with the application that uses the classifier in the first place, and it may thus vary depending on such application.
For the sake of generality, we deliberately avoid giving a strict definition for A being successful, i.e., we do not impose any specific restriction to A's success rate, so that the model can be flexibly adapted to capture a broad range of application scenarios. Concretely, we let our security game be parameterized by the number N of chosen samples that the adversary is expected to present, and by a threshold τ for a "good" success rate, because both values vary depending on the application to be protected. Indeed, in some cases a security breach occurs if the adversary can find even just one successful adversarial sample (i.e., n = 1), while in other cases only a large number of misclassified samples (n ≈ N) represents a serious threat.
Loosely speaking, A's goal in violating the security of a machine learning application is to achieve a given success rate for a reasonable value N. More precisely, given application-specific parameters N ∈ N and τ ∈ (0, 1], we say that the adversary is successful against the classifier (i.e., they violate the security of the system) if they achieve a success rate of at least τ in the EV-CSA game. We correspondingly define A's advantage as the probability of A being successful:
where the probability is taken over the randomness of the EV-CSA game (including A's and C's randomness).
Notice that in the deterministic case-both A and C are deterministic algorithms-the advantage is simply a boolean value indicating whether A is successful or not:
4 Mix'n'Squeeze: Overview and Design
In this section, we present our solution to enhance the robustness of machine learning defenses to adversarial samples. We start off by discussing the general principle behind our defense, namely to make the success of adversarial samples unpredictable. We then describe our solution, Mix'n'Squeeze, which implements this principle via input randomization.
Overview of Mix'n'Squeeze
One way to introduce"unpredictability" to the responses of a deterministic classifier is to retrain regularly in the background: this prevents adversarial samples (that were successful at some point) to fool the classifier again at a later time. We note, however, that while implementing this measure could reduce the effectiveness of adversaries, it would also significantly increase the computational costs due to re-iterating the training process on a regular basis. One possible advantage of regular retraining is that every adversarial sample which is detected as such will, later on, be always classified correctly. Thus, to be successful in the long run, an adversary has to constantly search for new adversarial samples. On the downside, retraining a deterministic classifier does not offer protection in the short term, as the classifier's decisions within two training periods are deterministic, and can thus be predicted for already seen inputs. Also, it requires human intervention to correct misclassifications, which is an expensive process. In this work, we explore a different avenue to enhance deep learning defenses by introducing "unpredictability" via input randomization. Our defense, that we name Mix'n'Squeeze, introduces randomness at feature level, for each feature component and within a predefined threshold, so that it does not bias the prediction excessively in any particular direction. The intuition here is to slightly randomize every input in a manner to which adversary cannot adapt by predicting it in advance. Most deep learning models are sensitive to changes in input. If carefully crafted, even minor perturbations can lead to a misclassification (which can in principle be controlled by adversaries). We stress that adding randomness individually to each pixel is different from perturbing the entire image at random. While the randomness added at individual feature level does not destroy the patterns of the pixels, which is critical for correct classification, it does introduce a source of unpredictability in the defense mechanism which-we argue-makes attacks less likely to succeed. Namely, adding randomness makes it hard for the adversary to search for adversarial perturbations as the system is no longer predictable. This forces the adversary to make perturbations larger in order to subsume the randomness introduced without violating the distance bounds, resulting in a considerably harder task. In addition, the randomized nature of the resulting classifier no longer guarantees that identical adversarial inputs yield the same predictions: given this, an adversary who finds a successful adversarial sample is not guaranteed to succeed with such sample all the times.
Note that we introduce randomness to the input only while testing and not while training: this is done to ensure we train a diverse classifier which works for a varied set of inputs. Limiting the training would result in a rigid classifier which cannot handle a diverse set of inputs, whereas adding randomness only limits the input samples and not the classifier itself.
The increased robustness achieved by randomized classifiers clearly depends on the quality of the randomness, which should be unpredictable from the adversary's perspective. Thus, it is crucial for security that the random noise be generated from a high-entropy key to seed the underlying cryptographic random number generator (PRG)-to achieve the strong cryptographic property of pseudorandomness [3] .
Note that the proposed defense is independent of the machine learning model and acts as a protective layer between user input and the classifier in conjunction with the defense in place. The modularity allows plugging the defense layer to any machine learning model.
Concretely, when applied to image classification, Mix'n'Squeeze preprocesses the image input to the original classifier C by adding a perturbation rand, chosen uniformly at random from the real interval [−δ , +δ ], δ ∈ [0, 1], to each pixel. Here, we denote by C a generic DL classifier enhanced with feature squeezing as described in Section 2.4. More specifically, Mix'n'Squeeze comprises of the following subroutines:
Setup. This procedure performs any instruction needed to initialize the original system. In addition, it sets the value δ ∈ [0, 1] for the magnitude of the randomness (setting δ = 0 leaves the input unchanged, while δ = 1 is almost equivalent to generating a fresh input uniformly at random), and initializes the random number generator. The value of δ is crucial to preserve the accuracy of the classifier as well as improving its robustness to adversarial samples. We discuss this in detail in Section 5.2.
Training. Since our defense mechanism does not affect the training phase, this step is the same as for the original system. Upon completion of this phase, we can assume a trained (deterministic) classifier C : X → Y for images in X, which we will use as a basis for our randomized classifier C $ , as we see next.
Classification. Upon receiving an input image x, the randomized classifier C $ proceeds as follows: it selects a uniformly random key k s to seed the underlying pseudorandom generator G, hence expands this key, feeding nonces to G, until a sufficient amount of (pseudo)randomness has been generated to randomize all pixels of x. The randomization of each pixel Pixel[i] consists in adding a random value rand ∈ [−δ , +δ ]. When the value of the pixel goes outside the allowed intensity threshold (normalized to [0,1] in our experiments), we clip them at the edges instead of taking a modulo and wrapping around. This is performed to bias the randomness for pixels that are close to the intensity thresholds, which helps to preserve accuracy of the classifier for legitimate samples. The process is repeated for every color channel. Hence, for grayscale images, we add randomization just once as there is only one channel, while for color RGB images randomness is added three times, once for each channel (i.e., "R", "G", and "B", respectively), individually per pixel. The pre-processing routine of Mix'n'Squeeze is described in Figure 2 . Finally, the image x resulting from running Randomize pixels on input x is then fed to the (deterministic) classifier C, and the resulting predictionŷ = C(x ) is returned as label for x. The perturbation magnitude δ should be sufficiently large to be effective against adversarial samples, and at the same time be sufficiently small to preserve the classifier's accuracy on normal samples. Therefore, an optimal value for δ should offer the best tradeoff between accuracy and robustness. In Section 5, we analyze in details how to choose δ in order to establish a strong tradeoff between the achieved accuracy and robustness for a classifier based on feature squeezing [35] . Figure 3 depicts an example of applying the Randomize pixels subroutine of Mix'n'Squeeze to images of hand-written digits taken from the MNIST dataset (see Section 5 for details). We note that despite significant observable noise, the images remain meaningful to the human eye. We show in Section 5 that even a large magnitude δ for the randomness does not remarkably degrade the model accuracy.
Example: a graybox attack
As discussed in Section 3, the deterministic nature of many defenses can be leveraged by adversaries to mount successful attacks. Indeed, if a classifier makes deterministic predictions, an adversary can search for successful adversarial samples by observing the classifier's reaction on several inputs x obtained by gradually perturbing an initial sample x-picking the next perturbation depending on how the current sample affects the classifier-until they find one that fools the classifier. Moreover, once such a successful adversarial sample has been found, it would always be misclassified unless the classifier is retrained with new data.
We argue that letting a classifier make probabilistic predictions has the potential to significantly improve robustness against adversarial examples. Namely, assume a scenario where the adversary can submit a number of chosen samples N (e.g., we will set N = 25 for our evaluation) and, for the sake of analysis, all of them shall be misclassified (i.e., τ = 1). This captures a number of applications, such as authentication and access control, in which legitimate users are identified by submitting a specific PIN or password (bounded by a maximum number of failed attempts).
Recall from the discussion of Section 3 that the adversary's advantage in the EV-CSA game (cf. Figure 1 ) against a deterministic classifier C is 1 if A does reach the targeted success rate τ, otherwise it is 0. Since we require A to achieve success rate τ = 1, this means that an adversary can bypass the system if they can find at least τ · N = N adversarial samples. Note in particular that, due to the classifier being deterministic, A can use C as an oracle (cf. oracle Classify in the evasion game from Figure 1 ) to test whether a given example succeeds or not and, if it does, that sample will always be misclassified. Therefore, deterministic classifiers can be completely bypassed as soon as an attacker finds sufficiently many successful samples.
We argue that randomized classifiers can improve the robustness of a machine learning system without penalizing accuracy. Due to the probabilistic nature of the predictions made by a randomized classifier C $ , the success rate achieved by an adversary A that aims to subvert Mix'n'Squeeze is a random variable (over the randomness used by C $ ) which indicates the probability of A achieving success rate τ = 1. Importantly, since the classifier's predictions depend on random choices made internally by C $ , the EV-CSA game against C $ is more difficult than that against C, unless A can infer the randomness used by C $ -which would violate the security of the pseudorandom generator in use.
We now analyze the provisions of a randomized classifier C $ against a graybox attacker A * that follows a greedy strategy which seeks to maximize their advantage in the EV-CSA game for threshold τ = 1. The attack proceeds as follows. First, A * searches for adversarial samples x i 's which are misclassified by oracle Classify and, for each of these samples, it computes an estimate of the probabilityp i that x i is labeled wrongly (this can be done by submitting the same sample x i multiple times to Classify and counting how often it succeeds). Upon completion of this step, the adversary collected a number of pairs (x i ,p i ). Second, using the available pairs, A * selects N samples x i 1 , . . . , x i N among those which are most likely to be misclassified (i.e., with highestp i value), and submits these samples to the Attack oracle, one by one. Assuming that the estimated valuesp i are exact, A * obtains the following advantage in the evasion game:
The advantage achieved by A * depends on how likely the presented chosen samples are to be misclassified.
In the next section we study the aforementioned attack when C $ is instantiated with our proposal.
In particular, Figure 6 shows how A * 's advantage against Mix'n'Squeeze varies with N when the adversarial samples are generated from three specific datasets using different attack strategies against the underlying classifier C (see Section 5 for details). In almost all cases, the advantage of A * against C $ (δ > 0) is considerably smaller than the advantage achieved by the same strategy when no randomization is used (δ = 0), especially for small values of N (i.e., N ≤ 25). Indeed, while in the deterministic case all attack strategies yield a relative large number N * of adversarial samples that always succeed (leading to advantage 1 for N ≤ N * ), our defense ensures that only a few of these sample succeed with high probability, and hence the achieved advantage Π N k=1p i k decreases significantly. As a concrete example, consider an attack that generates adversarial samples using targeted CW with norm L ∞ , and let the original classifier C use Median Smoothing 2x2 as defense (cf. the second graphic in row 2 and column 3 in Figure 6 ). For N = 25, the advantage against C is 1, while it decreases to 0.55, 0.1, and 0.05 respectively against Mix'n'Squeeze when the magnitude of randomness is δ = 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8. Therefore, we argue that Mix'n'Squeeze is particularly well-suited to security-critical applications, especially those limiting the number of attempts an adversary has to break in. For instance, such a solution could be combined with other security measures to construct a second-factor authentication system. In contrast, in a similar scenario, a deterministic classifier would immediately be defeated once sufficiently many adversarial samples are found.
Evaluation and Results
In this section, we test the defenses proposed by Xu et al. [35] against 11 state-of-the-art attacks and one additional adaptive attack [13] ; subsequently, we show how randomness can provide desirable security properties. The results demonstrate that Mix'n'Squeeze helps in combating adversarial samples using key based randomness in conjunction with deep learning defenses. We show that randomness hardens Feature Squeezing further by adding unpredictability to adversarial samples. Overall, the accuracy over legitimate samples is decreased only slightly while the accuracy over adversarial samples increases in most cases. This makes the system more secure as the errors become unpredictable, and thus decreases adversary's the confidence. Before presenting evaluation results, we introduce our setup.
Setup for Evaluating Mix'n'Squeeze
Attacks. We evaluate Mix'n'Squeeze against 11 stateof-the-art attacks with 3 distance metrics and one additional attack (adaptive w.r.t. Feature Squeezing) [13] . As proposed by Xu et al. [35] , we analyze two variations of each targeted attack: (i) next: targets the class next to the ground truth class modulo number of classes (ii) least-likely (LL): targets the class which the image is least-likely to be classified as. Specifically, we analyze Mix'n'Squeeze for the following attacks: Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [10] , Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [17] , Carlini and Wagner L 0 , L 2 and L ∞ attacks (CW) [6] (Next & LL), DeepFool [21] , Jacobian Saliency Map Approach (JSMA) [25] (Next & LL) and finally an adaptive attack against Feature Squeezing by He et al. [13] .
Datasets. We use MNIST, CIFAR-10, ImageNet datasets to conduct our experiments. These datasets are widely used in the machine learning community and also for adversarial learning research such as Feature Squeezing [35] and MagNet [20] . MNIST is a dataset of hand-written digits (0-9) encoded as 8-bits grayscale images of size 28 × 28 pixels (one color channel per pixel). CIFAR-10 is a dataset of 32 × 32 pixel images with 24-bit color per pixel (three color channels per pixel) and 10 classes. The ImageNet dataset contains 1.2 million images for training and 50 000 images for validation. They are of various sizes and hand-labeled with 1000 classes. The images are preprocessed to 224 × 224 pixels and encoded with 24-bit color per pixel.
Target models. The attacks are tested on pre-trained state-of-the-art models as used in Feature Squeezing [35] . We use a 7-layer CNN for MNIST 4 , a DenseNet model for CIFAR-10 5 [16] and MobileNet [15] for ImageNet with a top-1 accuracy of 99.43%, 94.84% and 68.36% respectively. The prediction performance of these models is at par with best models 6 .
To study the benefits of introducing randomness, we use the same data samples as used by Xu et al. [35] . We use 100 adversarial samples for each of the 11 attacks for all datasets. Each color channel of the pixel is normalized to be in the range [0, 1]. We use 10 000 legitimate samples for MNIST and CIFAR-10 and 200 samples for ImageNet (due to high computation cost) to study the effect of adding randomness to the defenses.
Experimental setup. We evaluate the efficacy of the 3 defenses proposed by Xu et al. [35] -bit depth reduction, median smoothing and non-local smoothing, when combined with randomness. We study each of the 11 attacks against the 3 defenses with varying parameters for 3 datasets. The experiment is repeated 200 times for each randomness level to compute the statistics. In our evaluation, the accuracy over adversarial samples is averaged over 200 runs and probability of each sample being misclassified is also computed over 200 runs to calculate the advantage for a given key length. We note that for the deterministic case when no randomness is added (δ = 0) the results do not change.
Implementation. We implemented Mix'n'Squeeze in Python and executed it using CPython. Namely, we adapted the open source code released by Xu et al. 7 to implement our solution. We use a machine with 3.5 GHz processor and 32 GB RAM for our experiments.
Results
In this section we present the results of our evaluation under the setting described. Choosing δ . Choosing the randomness magnitude δ appropriately is vital to designing an effective defense. The choice depends upon the nature of dataset and the defense used. As we show in the paragraphs ahead the behavior of defenses can vary for grayscale and color images. We study these variations extensively by running experiments for changing δ . We present our evaluation of MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets next. Figure 4 shows the behavior of accuracy of the classifier for both adversarial and legitimate samples as input randomization (δ ) is increased. The accuracy decreases as δ is increased. Squeezing via reducing bit-depth shows a drastic drop in accuracy beyond a certain randomness for most attacks; as δ increases, a larger fraction of pixels breach the quantization threshold which results in them being flipped to 0 or 1 despite being very distant earlier, this results in accuracy dropping sharply. The CW0 adversarial samples show an improvement in accuracy for high δ , this is due to large L 0 perturbations being undone due to noise. Median smoothing methods are less affected by large randomness values due to the randomness being averaged out. Hence we observe a gradual decline in accuracy with increasing randomness. The advantage (Adv ev-csa A * ,N,1 (C $ ), cf. Equation 6) curve shows more interesting behavior, for squeezing via bit-depth reduction the advantage decreases for low values of δ but then rises sharply, we note that this tends to happen at roughly same δ value. For large δ the defense does not work and the adversary is always able to discover samples which are misclassified. The chosen application of randomization does not produce a pixel such that all its values are equally likely (due to clipping values outside the bounds), hence, high levels of δ biases the classification of a sample causing repeated misclassification, resulting in a rise in advantage. Median smoothing defenses show a more uniform behavior with the advantage rising only at very large δ . We conclude that an appropriately chosen δ provides desirable security properties, we found that δ = 0.2 for bit-depth reduction and δ = 0.5 for median smoothing provides the best trade-off between accuracy (adversarial and legitimate samples) and advantage. We present the ac- The advantage is computed for the number of chosen samples (N) set to 25. We also plot the accuracy of the model for legitimate samples as δ increases (shown once for each defense as the curve does not change).
MNIST.
curacy values in Table 2 . We note that the accuracy decreases slightly over legitimate samples. For comparison, Table 1 shows the accuracy of defenses when no randomness is added [35] . We show the advantage only for the number of chosen samples (N) set to 25, however, the shape of the curve remains same for varying N and is only shifted up or down the y-axis on decreasing or increasing the N, hence the conclusions do not change. Figure 5 shows the probabilities of the prediction errors when used with 3 × 3 median smoothing with and without randomness. Each row represents a specific attack strategy A; the x-axis represents the adversarial sample set X A (in particular |X A | = 100); the color intensity of each cell indicates the estimated probability (over the classifier's randomness) that the corresponding adversarial sample succeeds (note, this probability is binary for a deterministic classifier). However, when randomness is introduced the error probabilities spread out for a large number of samples as they are no longer deterministic. For each of the considered attacks A, the empirical error over X A can be computed by summing up the probabilities that each adversarial sample in X A succeeds, i.e., err
For ease of presentation, we only present the results applied to one defense in order to to demonstrate the effect of randomness, the results for other defenses are similar. Figure 6 plots the advantage of the adversary for increasing number of chosen samples (N) under varying randomness (δ ). As the number of chosen samples increases, it becomes harder for the adversary to fool the system. We see that without randomness the advantage shows binary behavior as the number of misclassifications and their probability remain constant and drop to 0 as N increases (this confirms the theoretical predictions from Section 4.2). In contrast, the advantage drops much more sharply when randomness is introduces. The drop is not always consistent for bit-depth squeezing due to errors increasing as discussed earlier. However, advantage curve for δ = 0.2 is always below the curve for δ = 0, clearly demonstrating that randomness makes adversarial prediction harder. Similarly, considering the drop in accuracy, the curve for δ = 0.5 provides an optimum trade-off for median smoothing.
CIFAR-10.
The results for running Mix'n'Squeeze within the CIFAR-10 dataset are similar to MNIST: adding randomness helps make misclassified samples unpredictable. Note that CIFAR-10 has color and each pixel has three color channels each of which are normalized to [0, 1]. We introduce randomness individually to each channel for each pixel, hence the effect of randomness becomes significant even at low δ values. Figure 7 (cf. Appendix A) shows that accuracy over both legitimate and adversarial samples drops sharply on increasing δ . The accuracy over adversarial samples improves significantly at δ = 0.05 for almost all defenses with just a small drop over legitimate samples. At δ = 0.05 the drop in adversarial advantage is significant for almost all attacks. These results are confirmed in Figure 8 (cf. Appendix A) where the advantage drops much more sharply as number of chosen samples is increased at δ = 0.05, hence we choose it as the optimum trade-off point for accuracy vs. advantage for varying δ (cf. Ta- . Large values of δ make the classifier unusable as accuracy drops.
ImageNet
As seen in Figures 9 & 10 (cf. Appendix A) , the results of running Mix'n'Squeeze with the ImageNet dataset are similar to MNIST and CIFAR-10. We present the accuracy values in Tables 1 & 2 . The behavior of accuracy and advantage for the ImageNet dataset is similar to that of CIFAR-10 (cf. Figures 7 & 8) . Identical to our evaluation in the CIFAR-10 dataset, we note that Mix'n'Squeeze introduces small randomness for each color channel.
Interpretation of results. Increase in the magnitude of randomness drives the accuracy of the classifier over legitimate samples towards 10% as classification becomes akin to guessing (for classification over 10 classes as in MNIST and CIFAR-10). We made a deliberate choice to clip the pixel values when they go outside the allowed bounds of [0, 1] rather than wrapping around. A value of δ = 1 and wrapping around the pixel values when they go out of bounds produces a truly random pixel, and hence the image. We found that at this level of randomness, accuracy over legitimate samples becomes close to 10%. Even lower values of δ produce a sharp drop in accuracy over legitimate samples, hence we choose to clip the values when they go out of bounds. Our primary motivation is to perturb the pixels in a manner which subsumes the adversarial perturbation and to which the adversary cannot adapt while keeping the usefulness of the classifier intact. The optimum magnitude of randomness δ to be used is contingent on the defense used. High values of Table 1 : Accuracy of original Feature Squeezing defenses without randomness (δ = 0) over adversarial samples (%). Xu et al. [35] omit DeepFool on MNIST as the adversarial samples generated appear unrecognizable to humans; non-local smoothing is not applied to MNIST as it is hard to find similar patches on such images for smoothing a center patch. JSMA is omitted for ImageNet due to large memory requirement. δ have strong effect on the accuracy when used in conjunction with bit depth reduction, as it could change the value of a pixel drastically if the bit depth is low. In contrast, methods like local and non-local smoothing are much more resilient to high δ , as they average out the noise from sections of images. The noise that we add, being additive, is filtered out. Note that we want to use the largest value of δ possible so as to subsume the adversarial perturbations while still maintaining the accuracy. Not all defenses are equally potent for all attacks and datasets hence δ must be carefully chosen. Mix'n'Squeeze can mitigate the limitation of a weak de-fense to some extent, as seen in case of CIFAR-10 bit depth (5-bit) defense where the accuracy over adversarial samples increases by almost 2.5 times. However, efficacy of defense is critical to have any success in general, and randomness alone cannot help.
Semi-adaptive attacks
He et al. [13] presented an adaptive attack specifically on Feature Squeezing. The attack is a modified version of that proposed by Carlini and Wagner [6] and finds adversarial samples which remain adversarial even after feature squeezing is applied. To evaluate the effectiveness of Mix'n'Squeeze against this attack, we executed the attack using various squeezing techniques on 100 samples of the MNIST dataset (as chosen in et al. [13] ). We embedded Mix'n'Squeeze only to the function which squeezes the inputs. As seen in Table 3 , the randomness exhibited by Mix'n'Squeeze results in a marginal loss in classification accuracy of non-adversarial samples and in a considerable boost in the accuracy of adversarial samples for all the squeezing techniques. In particular, for δ = 0.2 (bit-depth reduction) and δ = 0.5 (median smoothing), Mix'n'Squeeze improves the classification accuracy of non-adversarial samples from 0% to over 95% and 70% respectively.
Concluding Remarks
In this work, we argue that secure defenses for deep learning should make it hard for an attacker to predict the success of adversarial samples. We present a security model to formalize robustness to adversarial samples and capture this notion of unpredictability in a rigorous way. We also propose a novel defensive technique, Mix'n'Squeeze, that specifically targets unpredictability by introducing random noise to the input. Our technique can be flexibly included as a pre-processing step to existing classifiers, and in particular it can be combined with other defenses. We evaluate an instantiation of our proposal, combined with feature squeezing, against state-of-the-art blackbox (i.e., non adaptive) and graybox (i.e., semi-adaptive) attacks. Our benchmark results show that Mix'n'Squeeze can enhance the security of machine learning algorithms in a graybox model at minimal drop in accuracy over legitimate samples. We do not evaluate the robustness of Mix'n'Squeeze against whitebox (i.e., fully adaptive) attacks.
A Further Evaluation Results
We provide further evaluation results for the accuracy on adversarial samples and corresponding advantage of Mix'n'Squeeze, for the CIFAR-10 dataset (Figures 7 and 8) , and for the ImageNet dataset (Figures 9 and 10 ). 
